Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading by Sofia Ceppi, Nicola Gatti (auth.), Esther David, Enrico

By Sofia Ceppi, Nicola Gatti (auth.), Esther David, Enrico Gerding, David Sarne, Onn Shehory (eds.)

This quantity comprises 18 completely refereed and revised papers detailing contemporary advances in examine on designing buying and selling brokers and mechanisms for agent-mediated e-commerce. They have been initially awarded on the eleventh overseas Workshop on Agent-Mediated digital trade (AMEC 2009) collocated with AAMAS 2009 in Budapest, Hungary, or the 2009 Workshop on buying and selling Agent layout and research (TADA 2009) collocated with IJCAI 2009 in Pasadena, CA, united states. The papers specialize in themes akin to person agent habit and agent interplay, collective habit, mechanism layout, and computational points, all within the context of e-commerce purposes like buying and selling, auctions, or negotiations. They mix techniques from various fields of arithmetic, computing device technology, and economics corresponding to man made intelligence, allotted platforms, operations study, and video game concept.

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Additional resources for Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Markets: AAMAS Workshop, AMEC 2009, Budapest, Hungary, May 12, 2009, and IJCAI Workshop, TADA 2009, Pasadena, CA, USA, July 13, 2009, Selected and Revised Paper

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We showed that the first two approaches induce truth telling but do not induce effort if the information is costly to produce. The third approach does induce effort, but in some settings the experts gain by misreporting about the reliability of the service provider for which they hold no or little information. Although not foolproof, we argue that a combination of approaches mitigates most of the concerns and works in most cases. At the same time, there are a number of open problems which remain to be studied.

In: Proc. of the 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Patras, Greece, pp. 448–452 (2008) 8. : Fault tolerant mechanism design. Artificial Intelligence 172(15), 1783–1799 (2008) 9. : Mechanisms for information elicitation. Artificial Intelligence 172(16-17), 1917–1939 (2008) Approximating the Qualitative Vickrey Auction by a Negotiation Protocol Koen V. nl Abstract. A result of Bulow and Klemperer has suggested that auctions may be a better tool to obtain an efficient outcome than negotiation.

First, in our case experts need to make observations about multiple service providers, but in the end only one of these providers is selected. This means that, if the scoring rule is conditioned on the outcome, only the information about the selected provider can be evaluated. The experts may therefore misreport their information about other providers. This can partially be addressed using a peer-prediction method, where a payment is not conditioned on the actual outcome, but on the reports submitted by other agents, but we show that this approach has other limitations in our setting.

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